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Introduction 
 
 “The defence industry is vital to Scotland”1 
 
The above quote from the recent House of Commons 
Scottish Affairs Committee report concerns the volume of 
economic activity that the defence industry supports in 
Scotland. We examine this issue below and find that it can 
be difficult to accurately establish the importance of 
defence to the Scottish economy. Defence issues are 
ultimately political decisions and we also argue that this 
dearth of information is important in the light of a number of 
political developments that could potentially affect the 
contribution that defence makes to Scotland. We discuss a 
number of these developments and attempt where possible 
to gauge their impact, but it is clear that our ability to make 
rational choices on defence would be improved by an 
improved set of figures on the economic consequences of 
defence decisions.  
 
The significance of defence at a community level is well 
illustrated by the UK Government’s recent decision to 
cancel its planned restructuring of the missile testing site in 
the Western Isles. The decision to cancel, which would 
have saved an estimated £50 million but involved the loss 
of 125 jobs on Benbecula, was taken because the 
economic costs to the local economy were considered to 
be too high, a point made by the Scottish Secretary:  
 
“The potential savings to the Ministry of Defence 
were not worth the cost to the islands' economy. It 
just wasn't a price worth paying for the island”
2
. 
 
The defence industry in Scotland - 
background 
While it can difficult to establish its importance even in 
terms of a simple measure such as employment, there is 
little doubt that defence is an important sector in Scotland.  
We look at two key indicators of defence in Scotland, the 
first of which is the number of military and associated 
civilian personnel. Outside the military, Scotland also has 
several large-scale defence contractors, including Babcock 
International at Faslane and Rosyth and BAE Systems 
Surface Ships shipbuilders in Glasgow and a number of 
global companies who maintain a presence in Scotland 
because of defence work, including Raytheon, Thales and 
others.  
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Service personnel 
Table 1 details the 2007 level of service employment in 
Scotland. The UK Government’s Defence Analytical 
Services and Advice (DASA) database shows that 12,400 
military service men and women were stationed here, 
around 7.6% of the UK total. To a small extent Scotland 
benefits less than proportionately than the rest of the UK 
from this part of defence, given its current UK population 
share is around 8.4%
3
.  
 
While small relative to, for example, the estimated 220,882 
jobs in Manufacturing
4
, the 12,400 military jobs clearly 
constitute a substantial source of employment. As the 
example above shows, however, defence employment may 
be very significant locally. Table 2 below illustrates this by 
detailing employment in six areas, which together account 
for 86% of all service employment in Scotland.  
 
The larger economies of Glasgow and Edinburgh mean 
that in relative terms the contribution service personnel 
make to overall activity is relatively limited. It is clear, 
however, that service employment is significant in areas 
like Fife and Highland, and is particularly important in 
Moray and in Argyll & Bute. We also note that looking at 
employment by Council, the lowest level published, does 
not allow us to identify the extent to which small areas 
within these regions may rely on the military as a source of 
jobs. 
 
Table 3 below gives some indication of the local 
importance of military employment by examining its size 
(relative to both total working population and population in 
employment) in three of the smaller areas. The figures for 
Argyll & Bute and Moray make clear the extent to which 
both rely on defence for a significant volume of their overall 
economic activity. 
 
Non-service personnel 
The military also employ civilians, and DASA (2007) figures 
show around 6,500 civilian jobs at military facilities in 
Scotland (Table 4). DASA therefore estimates that a total 
of 18,900 people were directly employed in the military 
sector in Scotland in 2007. 
 
Recent employment change 
It is also interesting to observe how military employment 
has changed in recent years. According to DASA figures, 
Scotland’s dependence on military employment has been 
falling - armed service employment in Scotland fell by over 
one-third from 19,300 to 12,400 between 1990-2007. 
Civilian employment also fell by over a third between 1997-
2007, from 10,300 in 1997
5
 to 6,500 in 2007.  
 
It is likely that some of the change over this relatively long 
period simply reflects political change – a “Cold-War effect” 
is likely to have had some influence on this long-term 
reduction in numbers, as global political developments 
have meant a reduced need for armed forces since the 
early 1990’s. This is indeed borne out by the fact that the 
number of servicemen in the UK was 56,000 lower in 2007 
than in 1997.  
 
However, it is worth noting here that Scotland has 
experienced a substantially greater proportionate fall in 
employment when compared to the UK as a whole. Table 5 
below shows the change in total employment, military and 
civilian, since 2000
6
, when any effects of the 1990’s 
geopolitical developments have presumably worked 
through. Scotland has clearly seen a disproportionate 
reduction in all UK employment in more recent years. It is 
difficult to conclude anything other than that the 
contribution of military employment has fallen over time, 
and more so in Scotland than in the UK as a whole 
 
Defence contractors 
The other key aspect part of Scotland’s defence 
dependency is contractors who undertake defence work in 
Scotland. Since this paper is attempting to examine 
Scotland’s total dependence on defence we focus 
principally on the number of jobs supported in contractors, 
since this would allow us to estimate total employment in 
both the military and contractor sectors.  
 
i)  DASA estimates 
We begin by looking at official estimates on Scottish 
employment supported by UK military spending. DASA has 
developed estimates of the number of direct full time jobs 
in the UK that are supported by Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
spending and Table 6 details these for Scotland and the 
UK as a whole
7
.  
 
The table appears to highlight two interesting results. It 
shows firstly that the estimated number of jobs in 
companies in Scotland supported by MOD expenditure fell 
by 30% in the four years to 2006/07. Coupled with the 
reduced level of service employment discussed earlier, this 
would indicate that Scotland’s overall dependence on 
defence had fallen substantially. Secondly, Scotland’s 
share of total UK defence employment also fell sharply, 
from around 8% in 2002/03 to 5% in 2006/07, suggesting 
that Scotland’s defence contractors have lost comparative 
advantage compared to the UK.  
 
However, an examination of the basis of the figures in 
Table 6 casts considerable doubt on the accuracy with 
which they actually measure the number of jobs in 
Scotland supported by MOD spending. For example, DASA 
itself notes that the regional location codes on which the 
estimates are based can fail to distinguish how MOD 
contract expenditure is divided between the direct 
contractor and its sub contractors – if a sub-contractor is 
located in a different region from the main contractor, the 
underlying assumptions on regional expenditure will fail to 
match actual regional expenditure. The codes also fail to 
take account of changes in spending between regions over 
time – given that MOD contracts may last many years, 
movements of production between regions during the 
course of a contract may not be captured. Finally, the
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Table 1:   Service personnel 
 
  Number    
UK Regions  (FTE)* % of Total 
England 140,300  86.5 
Wales 5,000  3.1 
Scotland 12,400  7.6 
Northern Ireland 4,500  2.8 
 
Source: - UK Defence Statistics 2008, Table 2.3 
* Full-time equivalent 
 
 
Table 2:  Service personnel  
 
Selected Scottish  Regions  Number* 
 
Moray     3,100  
Argyll and Bute     2,980  
Edinburgh     1,550  
Fife     1,460  
Highland       620  
Glasgow 560 
Total 10,270 
 
Source:  DASA, TSP 10, Table 5.1 
* Full-time equivalent 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Military personnel as: 
 
 Moray Argyll & Bute Highland 
 
% of working age population 
 
5.9 
 
5.5 
 
0.5 
% of population in employment 6.9 6.8 0.6 
 
 
Source:  DASA, National Online Manpower Information Services (NOMIS) 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Civilian personnel 
 
 
UK Regions Number (FTE)* % of Total 
   
England 65,500 83.0 
Wales 2,400 3.0 
Scotland 6,500 8.2 
Northern Ireland 4,500 5.7 
 
Total 
 
78,900 
 
100.0 
 
Source:  UK Defence Statistics 2008, Table 2.3 
* Full-time equivalent 
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Table 5:  Fall in UK military employment, 2000-2008 
 
 
 % 
United Kingdom 6.2 
England 1.9 
Wales 39.8 
Scotland 17.9 
Northern Ireland 23.7 
 
 
Source:  UK Defence Statistics 2008, Table 2.3 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Employment dependent on UK military expenditure 
 
 
 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 
      
UK 135.0 135.0 123.0 130.0 135.0 
Scotland 10.0 10.0 9.0 9.0 7.0 
 
Source:  Ministry of Defence 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Employment in the naval, aerospace and defence industries, Scotland 2006 
 
 
 Number % 
   
Naval 7,291 45.0 
Aeorspace 4,537 28.0 
Defence 4,375 27.0 
 
Total 
 
16,203 
 
100 
 
 
Source:  ADS Scotland, Aerospace, Defence and Naval, Survey 2006 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Employment created by BAE Systems 
 
 Initial 
employment 
Additional 
employment 
Total 
employment 
 
Total 
 
3,404 
 
2,312 
 
5,717 
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procedure used to estimate employment is based on the 
structure of UK production in 1995.  
 
There is clearly a considerable amount of doubt on the 
accuracy of the DASA estimates. Our best assessment is 
that official UK government estimates actually provide very 
little useful guidance on the size of the economic 
contribution that defence spending makes to the Scottish 
economy. DASA developed the figures in Table 6 
specifically in response to questions from MPs and MSPs 
on the importance of defence to regional economies, but 
they appear to tell us very little about this and the estimates 
clearly need to be revisited. 
 
ii)  ADS Scotland survey 
An alternative source of information on defence contractors 
is the annual Scottish survey undertaken by ADS, an 
industry body representing the Aerospace, Defence and 
Security industries. We look below at the ADS 2006 survey 
findings, approximately the same period as the 2006/07 
DASA figures discussed above.  
 
We would ideally in the present context like to gauge the 
total amount of private sector employment created by 
defence spending in Scottish based contractors, and the 
ADS survey does go some way towards this. However, it 
only covers companies involved in aerospace, defence or 
security. Companies outside these sectors are not 
included, and ADS figures do not include employment in 
other sectors that may sell to the MOD.  
 
Secondly, the total amount of activity that is defence 
dependent is not always apparent. For example, ADS 
stated to the Scottish Affairs Committee that some 
aerospace work is defence-related, but the proportion of 
this is not recorded.  
 
Finally, ADS survey includes figures both for a Defence 
and a Naval sector. However, they have informed us that 
their Naval sector is wholly supported by defence spending, 
and we discuss it below as part of defence-dependent 
employment. 
 
The 2006 ADS survey shows that Aerospace, Defence and 
Security employed a total of 16,203 people in Scotland 
(Table 7). Assuming that Naval is wholly supported by 
defence spending, Defence and Naval together account for 
11,666 jobs. This is around two-thirds above the DASA 
estimate of 7,000 jobs, even though the ADS survey does 
not include all MOD spending. A comparison of the 2007 
ADS survey with the results of the previous year also show 
that employment in the Defence and Naval sectors actually 
grew by over 13%. The suggestion that employment in 
contractors increased, albeit based on one year’s data 
contrasts strongly with the DASA findings.   
 
The ADS survey details other important characteristics of 
the industry’s economic importance.  Firstly, the sector 
spent a significant amount on Research & Development in 
Scotland, £74 million in 2006. Reflecting this, ADS argue 
that the sector is important not only on account of the 
number of jobs it provides, but also because of the type of 
jobs – 5,100 employees are graduates, almost one-third 
(31.5%) of the total workforce. This high skill level is 
reflected in industry wages which are around 34% above 
the Scottish average.  
 
It also points to the industry’s position as a supplier of 
apprenticeships. It provided around 600 apprenticeships in 
2007, which it claims was around half of the Scottish total. 
Figures supplied to us by BAE Systems Surface Ships also 
confirm the importance of the industry’s role on this 
measure – the company has the largest apprenticeship 
scheme in Scotland, with over 500 apprentices taken on in 
the last five years. 
 
Spin-off effects 
All of the above employment estimates show only the direct 
jobs supported by military expenditure. They include only 
employment at military bases or in contractors, and do not 
take account of any multiplier effects that result from wage 
spending by employees or by contractor spending at 
suppliers. 
 
There is a very limited amount of information on the further 
impact of defence contracts, and it is of interest here to 
note that the MOD itself apparently has no knowledge of 
the spin-off impact of its own Carrier programme. When 
asked in a parliamentary question to estimate the indirect 
jobs created as a result of the carriers, the Minister for 
Defence procurement replied that the MOD “do not hold 
information relating to the number of indirect jobs”
8
.  
 
Recent research by the Fraser of Allander Institute does 
provide some measure of the extent to which one major 
contractor, BAE Systems Surface Ships, creates 
employment across the wider Scottish economy
9
. Table 8 
shows estimates of their total employment impact in 
Scotland. This shows that the company’s 3,404 employees 
in Glasgow support a further 2,312 jobs in Scotland once 
wage spending by employees and spending at local 
suppliers is taken into account. Every one job in Glasgow 
was estimated to support a further 0.68 of a job elsewhere 
in Scotland. The study also estimated that the £102.4 
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million worth of wages paid to employees in Glasgow 
supported a total of £156.4 million worth of Scottish wages.  
 
It is clear that the number of direct employees in defence 
must account for only a minimum estimate of the extent to 
which the defence industry supports employment in 
Scotland, but the current position is that we actually know 
little of this aspect of the industry’s wider impact. Further 
information on this type would clearly help to assess the 
overall importance of defence in Scotland. 
 
The outlook for defence 
As mentioned, a key issue surrounding defence is that 
decisions are ultimately political ones. We now examine a 
number of political developments that could affect the 
industry in Scotland, all of which could directly affect the 
amount of activity and employment it supports.  
 
Public expenditure 
The most immediate current issues surround the UK’s 
current fiscal problems and all three major UK political 
parties have recently signalled the need to restrain public 
expenditure. The MOD’s current budget is estimated at 
£32.6 billion in 2007/08, about 2.5% of UK GDP
10
 and there 
have been concerns about whether a budget of this size 
can be exempt from cuts.  
 
Both the current UK government and the main opposition 
party have committed themselves to holding a Strategic 
Defence Review (SDR) that will define the UK’s future 
military role for the forthcoming decade, and both parties 
have understandably been reluctant to spell out plans for 
defence in advance of this. However the SDR will not 
report until 2011. We simply do not at present know how 
pressure on the public finances might affect the UK 
government’s future plans for defence. Recent statements 
by the Secretary of State for Defence have thrown some 
doubt on the Government’s overall support for the defence 
budget. The Minister recently warned military leaders that 
they must “live in the real world” and said that the 
government “cannot exclude major shifts in the way we use 
defence spending”. 
11
 
 
The other main UK parties have signalled that defence 
spending either could (in the case of the Conservatives) or 
will (Liberal Democrats) be reduced. The Conservatives 
have indicated that they will instigate a defence review 
“quickly” should they form the next government, and have 
also said that this will examine a number of major defence 
projects. As the quote below confirms, such a review could 
include two major Scottish defence contracts, the aircraft 
carriers currently being constructed in Glasgow (later to be 
fitted at Rosyth) and the nuclear facilities at HM Naval Base 
Clyde: 
 
“Whether  ... the armed services need ... to 
project power through a proper navy and carriers: 
having the best replacement there is for an 
independent nuclear deterrent - these are 
reasons for all these things. But clearly, when you 
are reviewing spending, you have to review all 
spending”
12
 
 
The Shadow Chancellor has also implied that the new 
carriers are one of the major defence projects potentially 
subject to review
13
, and has said in particular that he 
wishes to examine the “break clauses” on the project. 
 
BAE Systems Surface Ships signed contracts to build the 
carriers in July 2008 and construction began in July this 
year. Construction is being undertaken at several yards in 
the UK and work will be ongoing in Glasgow until 2014 and 
2016 respectively. Final assembly of the ships has also 
begun at Rosyth in Fife. The carrier programme guarantees 
shipbuilding on the Clyde until 2016 and will also create 
work in Fife after that.  
 
It would extremely controversial to halt work that has 
already begun. As shown earlier, the company building the 
carriers is estimated to support a total of over 5,000 jobs in 
Scotland. The current position is that UK ministers have 
recently said that they will “continue to support the two 
shipyards”
14
 and the SNP have also said that they strongly 
support the decision to build the carriers. We are not aware 
of any Liberal Democrat statement on the carriers. A recent 
pamphlet by the party’s Treasury spokesman
15
 did suggest 
that that major savings could be made in the defence 
budget by cancelling or scaling down weapons systems, 
but suggested that the main targets were Eurofighter, the 
A400M transport aircraft and Trident. 
 
As noted, the carrier programme effectively sustains work 
on the Clyde until 2016. In addition, the MOD has also 
signed a Terms of Business Agreement (ToBA) with BAE 
Systems. The agreement, which intends to protect key 
industrial capabilities in British shipbuilding, gives the 
company a minimum of 15-years exclusivity on design, 
build and support for specified MOD shipbuilding 
programmes.  
 
The MOD has made it clear that the ToBA does not 
“commit the MOD to any particular level of expenditure in 
any geographical location” or specify how BAE Systems 
should plan its work
16
. However, recent years have seen 
Scotland performing strongly against the UK shipbuilding 
industry. For example, Scotland’s share of the UK 
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shipbuilding sector rose from 22% to 33% between 
2002/07 and Scottish Government figures show that its 
overall contribution to Scottish GVA rose from 0.29% to 
0.58% in the same period
17
. This recent strong 
performance shows that Scotland appears to be gaining 
comparative advantage in shipbuilding and it is a source of 
concern that uncertainty over the carriers may affect 
Scotland’s ability to contribute to future programmes. 
 
Another key defence contract affecting Scotland is Trident. 
The UK parliament voted to take the first steps towards 
renewing Trident in 2007
18
. The decision was supported by 
both main UK parties. The UK government has recently 
said that there is “no intention on this Government’s part of 
moving our position on Trident”
19
 and the Conservatives 
have said that while maintaining some form of UK nuclear 
deterrent is “non-negotiable”
20
 it has refused to rule out 
reviewing Trident.  
 
The Liberal Democrats are the only party to have made 
firm commitments on defence, including a recent statement 
that they would not renew the Trident programme. The 
party accepts that public spending must fall and the UK’s 
fiscal position is undoubtedly the key reason behind this 
decision. However, it is also important to note that the 
Liberal Democrats are also the first mainstream UK party to 
accept the argument that Trident no longer meets the UK’s 
defence needs, in effect saying that it is both unnecessary 
and unaffordable.  
 
Discussions over Trident are not new – its geopolitical 
justification has been subject to scrutiny since the demise 
of the Soviet Union, and Clarke (2004), for example, 
argues that: 
 
“the rationale for a strategic nuclear deterrent is 
increasingly weak....A world dominated by a 
single superpower hegemon...is not a world 
which gives minor players much of a role in 
strategic deterrence. It is scarcely conceivable 
that  that other known nuclear powers such as 
India, Pakistan or North Korea or even near 
nuclear powers such as Iran could become a 
strategic threat to the UK homeland...whatever 
British interests might be threatened.”
21
 
 
The Liberal Democrat leader recently summarised his 
party’s position as follows: 
  
“a cold war missile system designed to penetrate 
Soviet defences … at any time…from any 
location anywhere round the planet, is not our 
foremost security challenge now. We have got to 
be grown-up and honest about it”.
22 
 
The party has begun its own review of how Britain could 
operate a scaled-down deterrent, but have said that it 
would be an “unhappy event” if this concluded with Britain 
retaining a nuclear deterrent. We examine the position on 
Trident further below. 
 
European defence cooperation 
Public expenditure problems have also caused some to 
argue that if UK is unable to afford to sustain all of major 
current defence contracts then greater European 
cooperation in defence as a possible way forward. One 
proponent of this view is Sir Malcolm Rifkind, a former UK 
Secretary of State for Scotland, Defence and Foreign 
Affairs
23
. He argues that the current defence budget is 
simply “too big to be exempt from cuts”. One or other of the 
major projects is likely to be cancelled, and he suggests 
that “the most likely casualties are the aircraft carriers, the 
joint strike fighters and even Trident submarines”.  
 
The argument that greater cooperation may substitute for 
nationally-based defence policies is obviously likely to 
prove highly controversial and is almost certainly some way 
off. However, greater cooperation across a wide range of 
political functions has been an ongoing feature of the 
European Union since its inception, and will further 
increase with the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification. The 
underlying argument, that it is extremely difficult to 
envisage situations where a threat to the security of any 
one European Union member could not be considered as 
threat to all, means  European cooperation in defence is, 
according to Menzies Campbell,   “not only good military 
sense, it is a political necessity as well”
24
.  
 
The choice is between unaffordable national domestic 
capability and a greater pooling of defence capability at the 
regional level. If it is indeed the case that existing defence 
budgets proves to be unsustainable across Europe, the 
case for pooling resources does appear to strengthen and 
any move towards greater cooperation would clearly result 
in reduced defence spending. Where Scotland comes into 
this is difficult to say. Sir Malcolm himself gives little 
guidance on this except to argue that each country should 
specialise in the area which is most important to its own 
security – “for the UK, this would be maritime, for Germany 
its land forces”. 
 
Constitutional change 
The other key political issue is the prospect of constitutional 
change. Scottish independence could in theory affect any 
part of the defence sector in Scotland, since there would 
have to be a process of negotiation concerning ownership 
of defence assets following the break-up of the UK. In truth, 
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we know little about how either military employment or 
employment in defence contractors would actually be 
affected. The SNP has recently said that an independent 
nationalist administration would be happy to allow existing 
UK military forces to continue to be based in Scotland, 
stating that since Scotland and the rest of the UK would 
remain “friends and allies”, it would be “perfectly possible to 
share basing, procurement and training facilities with the 
rest of the UK”
25
. 
 
Predictably, this suggestion was 
immediately dismissed by other parties, who argue that 
what remains of the UK would have little interest in either 
retaining military resources or placing work with defence 
contractors. A Scotland Office source argued that: 
 
…The Royal Navy would not give contracts to a 
foreign country…in all, 20,000 defence-related jobs 
would be at risk…no Trident, no Nimrod, no 
Kinloss
26
. 
 
An outbreak of clarity from the political parties seems to be 
an unlikely prospect at the moment – notably, the Scottish 
Affairs Committee recently divided along party lines over 
whether its recent report should “refrain from speculation 
about any effect the establishment of an independent 
Scottish state might have on the provision of defence jobs 
within Scotland’s territorial boundaries”
27
. 
 
The constitutional question also raises particular issues 
concerning the nuclear facilities at HMNB Clyde. In 2002, 
Chalmers and Walker began their analysis by noting that 
among the states that possess nuclear weapons, “the 
United Kingdom is now regarded as one of the least 
problematic”, owing to, inter alia, its stable democracy, 
disciplined military forces and cooperative approach to 
international security
28
.  The thrust of this paper was on 
how Scottish independence might impact on the UK’s 
nuclear capability, particularly because the UK’s only 
nuclear weapons delivery mechanism is located in 
Scotland - with independence, what remains of the UK 
would then have its sole delivery mechanism located in a 
foreign country. 
 
The scenario outlined by Chalmers and Walker was that 
the advent of an independent Scotland under a nationalist 
administration would almost certainly result in the removal 
of nuclear weapons from Scotland. There is in fact little 
doubt that such a government would indeed insist on their 
removal - the SNP is a longstanding opponent of nuclear 
weapons, and its defence spokesman reiterated its stance 
as recently as last month, saying “No independent nation of 
five million has nuclear weapons, and nor should we”
29
.   
Like the common European defence policy outlined above, 
Scottish independence has yet to become a political reality. 
However, the possibility of Scotland having to face the 
choice over whether to retain nuclear weapons, as part of 
the wider decision over independence itself, has clearly 
become a more immediate issue with the election of an 
SNP administration in Holyrood in 2007 which proposes to 
hold an independence referendum. The economic effects 
of removing the weapons will be an important feature of 
this debate and it would clearly be useful to have some 
indication of the impact of this.  
 
It is clear that HMNB Clyde is a substantial local economic 
resource. As noted earlier, MOD figures indicate that just 
under 3,000 servicemen and women are stationed in Argyll 
& Bute. In addition, employment figures provided to us by 
Babcock Marine further emphasise the importance of 
Faslane and Coulport to the local area. Babcock Marine, 
who service and maintain Trident at Faslane, employs 
1,320 people at HMNB Clyde and 75% of its employees 
live within 10 miles of the base. Direct employment is thus 
around 4,300 jobs, a figure that does not include any MOD 
civilian personnel employed alongside the military, or any 
measure of the size of spin-off effects. 
 
The study published jointly by the Scottish Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament and the Scottish Trades Union 
Congress (SCND/STUC)
30
 in 2007 is the only recent 
attempt to estimate the impact of removing Trident from 
Scotland.  This study estimated that the removal of Trident 
would result in a loss of 2,191 jobs. However, some of the 
assumptions underlying this figure are clearly untested. For 
example, the estimate depends on there being no net 
reduction in the 500 Royal Marines designated to protect 
Trident, on the assumption that they would simply be 
allocated a new role and remain in Scotland. This seems 
unlikely given that they have the specific role of guarding 
Trident.  
 
The report also estimated that between 1,300 – 1,600 
sailors at HMNB Clyde were dependent on Trident. 
However, its estimate that only a total of 300 service jobs 
would be lost by cancelling Trident is based on its 
assumption that only 300 of these sailors are Scottish – 
sailors recruited from outwith Scotland are excluded. 
Despite the fact that these jobs are in Scotland because of 
Trident, they are not counted as part of the reduction in 
military jobs in Scotland associated with cancelling Trident. 
The report also argues that the savings in public spending 
created by cancelling Trident could be used to create local 
employment in other industries
31
, a state of affairs that will 
be more difficult to sustain in an era where overall public 
spending requires to be cut. 
 
Conclusions 
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Difficult choices on defence will need to be made in the 
future. Defence is an important issue in a number of current 
political debates, but we currently lack clarity on the 
consequences of the choices that will at some point need 
to be made. Official figures are lacking in many important 
respects and may even be misleading. Given also that 
these decisions will ultimately be made by voters, it would 
clearly assist the public if the political parties would spell 
out in more detail both what they believe are realistic 
options and the consequences of these. Neither of these 
situations seems likely to improve in the near future, but 
until we have this information we are making decisions in 
the dark. 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
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